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In 1920 Federal Judge Clarence Hale sentenced Carlo Ponzi to 5 years in prison for running a 
pyramid, ‘rob Peter to pay Paul’ scheme (1). On hearing the verdict Ponzi turned to one of 
the assembled journalists and handed him a hastily scribbled note, ‘transit gloria mundi’, 
which can be translated as: ‘thus passes worldly glory’ (Zuckoff 2006, 290). The swindler’s 
infamy endured to the extent that ninety years later in 2010, when Federal Judge Denis Chin 
sentenced another egregious fraudster, Bernie Madoff to a 150-year prison sentence, he 
invoked the earlier fraudsters name to describe the con; declaring that Madoff had been 
running a ‘Ponzi Scheme’. On hearing his sentence Madoff also made a histrionic gesture, 
with eyes welling, he mouthed an apparently heartfelt, ‘I’m sorry’ to the assembled court, 
who it was reported were deeply unimpressed (Arvelund 2009, 277). Further echoing the 
Ponzi case, a new verb was coined, ‘to be Madoffed’: meaning ‘to be cheated’, and one can 
speculate on whether this newly minted neologism will gain the same currency as Ponzi’s 
contribution to the syntax of criminality.   
 
The contention of this article is that Madoff and Ponzi share more than a dramatic court 
scene, rather they are both examples of a type of white-collar criminal who exploit the 
resources that inhere in social relationships to commit their crimes. The recurrence of white-
collar crime, (2) including affinity frauds (Perri and Brody 2011: 46) and financial/financial 
frauds (Payne, 201: 243-259), suggests that accounts that concentrate on fleeting 
circumstances are incomplete. (3) In response, this article will make the case that financial 
fraudsters or confidence men (conmen for short), exhibit shared character traits and 
psychological insights, which have been described as ‘grift sense’ (Gibbon and Garrity 1962). 
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Moreover, it is these shared character traits and psychological insights that constitute the 
essential reference points of financial frauds, as they enable conmen to ‘exploit inter-
relational weaknesses’ for criminal purposes. It follows that financial frauds, which have 
been committed at every stage of the history of capitalism (Mackay 1852/1995; Nash 1976), 
need to be understood and analysed in the context of these essential reference points. 
  
The article will present two illustrative cases (Stake 1995; Yin 2003, 2004) that explicitly 
demonstrate the recurring reference points that conmen use to facilitate their financial frauds. 
The cases selected are constructed from the Ponzi and Madoff financial frauds. These 
swindlers who remain the two most well-known financial criminals of the 20th; and (so far) 
21st centuries, and given their notoriety are usually mentioned in relation to each other. The 
article will illustrate that their ‘modus operandi’ shared common reference points, as it owed 
as much to their sophisticated socio-economic insights and consequent exploitation of social 
capital processes, as it did to their sophisticated insights into criminal financial schemes and 
financial engineering.  Furthermore, by analysing these financial frauds the article will 
examine how the embedded social fabric in networks generated economic outcomes, in these 
instances negative outcomes, as value was destroyed not created.  
 
These illustrative cases will be analysed within social capital, which according to Adler and 
Kwon has matured from a concept to a field of research (2014).  Social capital’s rise to 
prominence can in part be attributed to it being a federated or ‘umbrella construct’, which 
facilitates trans-disciplinary research to examine complicated and integrated social 
phenomena from a multitude of perspectives (Hirsch and Levin 1999). (4)  It is therefore 
unsurprising that social capital research lacks consensus and tends to be interpreted from the 
authors individual area of expertise (Foley and Edwards, 1999; Adler and Kwon, 2000).  For 
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this article, the understanding of the concept has been taken from Putnam’s neo- 
Tocquevelllian and communitarian interpretation that ‘…social capital refers to connections 
between individuals-social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that 
arise from them’ (2000: 19). This definition was selected as most appropriate as it emphasises 
networks, trust and reciprocity, which are all essential for understanding financial fraud. It is 
also an appropriate definition as its background assumptions were derived from historical 
research (Putnam, 1973). (5)  
 
This article will demonstrate that social relations and the resources that inhere in these 
relations, as described by the social capital concept, can be negative and result in dis-utilities 
(Pillai et al. 2017). This contribution will add to an emerging field of analysis that considers 
abnormal or deviant organizational behaviour, in terms of opposing positive and negative 
forces, usually expressed in the light and darkness metaphor (Linstead et al. 2014). For 
example, in historiography this metaphor is associated with Petrarch’s ‘Dark Ages’, to denote 
the decline of classical civilisation into medievalism. For this article the negatives of social 
capital will be described as its shadow aspect, which for financial fraud includes irrational 
decision making based on excessive in-group trust, as well as general credulity replacing due 
diligence. Thus, the article’s theoretical contribution will be to develop understanding of 
historical phenomenon, in this instance of financial fraud, with the application of the shadow 
side of the social capital concept. 
 
The article will proceed with a discussion of theories from criminology that explicate white-
collar crime. The article will then present illustrative cases of Ponzi and Madoff’s financial 
frauds. The article will proceed with a discussion of social capital’s ontological assumptions, 
optimistic bias, and the consequent strategy selected to operationalise the concept. Ponzi and 
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Madoff’s frauds will then be subject to a conceptual analysis to demonstrate that both of 
these white-collar criminals were experts at exploiting social capital for criminal purposes, 
with reference to the structural and relational sub-dimensions of social capital (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998, 242-266; Nielsen, 2003). A case comparison will then be presented. The 
article will conclude by arguing that the cases demonstrate how conmen use the shadow 
aspect of social capital for criminal purposes.  
 
Criminology and White-Collar Crime 
Criminologists have sought to theorise individual motivations and situational phenomena to 
explain the persistence white-collar crimes. The discipline of criminology was established by 
Sutherland who first coined the term ‘white-collar crime’ in 1939, and was then developed by 
his protégé, Cressey, who created the influential ‘fraud triangle’ model, as well as the 
orthodoxy that characterises fraudsters as ‘trust violators’ (1979). Criminologists have built 
on these foundations to develop a number of theories to explain white-collar crime (Payne 
2012: 435-462). For example, Ponzi in the euphoria of the boom-time twenties, and Madoff 
in the neo-liberalism ascendancy of the nineties and noughties, can be understood with 
reference to ‘Institutional Anomie Theory’ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994/2013).  
1994/2013). This theory makes a macro-level analysis, which contends that contemporary 
societal norms over-promoted values associated with financial success and materialism, while 
under-promoting ethical values and the legality, and the legitimacy of this analysis is 
illustrated by the ubiquity of fraud in the Madoff era (Economist, 2012,  28th January). (6)  
 
Neutralizing theory, which explains how white-collar criminals rationalize their behaviour by 
blaming the victims is also relevant, as both Ponzi and Madoff were convinced that their 
investors were complicit in the operation of the frauds: both swindlers stated their investors 
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know the returns were too good be true and preferred to look the other way rather than be 
confronted with the unpalatable truth of the illegality of their investments (Sykes and Matza, 
1957).  
 
Social network analysis (SNA) is another perspective favoured by criminologists, who have 
studied the exploitative and deleterious effects of socially embedded networks and 
transactions. (7) These structural analyses of criminal networks draw attention to the 
importance of constructing and maintaining socially embedded networks to provide socially 
embedded proximity between criminal and victim, termed affinity frauds. (8) Social networks 
are therefore vital for facilitating fraud as they create proximity. In the syntax of conmen 
(confidence men), social networks allowed ‘ropers’ to identify the investors, the ‘marks’ to 
be ‘roped in, told the tale and then fleeced’ (Lewis 2012, 14).  Nash et al (2013) have 
comprehensively reviewed the social network characteristics of ‘Bernard Lionel Madoff 
Financial Securities’ (BLMIS) considering the morphology (shape and structure) of the 
financial fraud’s ego-centric and socio-centric networks. 
 
There is however, a limitation of these structural approaches, in that they under-report the 
human and qualitative qualities of personal interaction and social groups. This limitation has 
been commented on by the leading social capital theorist Robert Putnam who has cautioned 
that: ‘Knowledge needs a social context to be meaningful’ (2000: 170-180).  Accordingly, the 
extant social network (sometimes called structural) analyses of the BLMIS’ financial fraud 
need to be expanded to take account of the social context of the fraudster’s networks. This 
article will therefore expand the social network/structural perspective to analyse the 
qualitative social context of the fraud’s embedded network interaction; that is to focus on the 
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network interactions that are dependent on the ‘persistence of human contact’ as described by 
social capital (Cohen and Prusak 2005: 179-180).  
 
It is also worth noting that while criminal profiling is an inexact discipline (Walters and 
Geyer, 2004), nonetheless there is consensus in criminology that white-collar criminals do 
not exhibit a homogenous profile or set of character traits (ibid, 280). Thus, according to 
orthodox criminology, there is no white-collar criminal archetype. Conversely, this article 
will contend that white-collar criminals exhibit a number of shared reference points, a 
contention supported by a reading of historical examples of various instances of white-collar 
crime. To take one example, John Law infamous for his ‘Mississippi Scheme’, exhibited 
conman essential reference points in being an intelligent, meticulous, charismatic and 
immaculately dressed crowd pleaser (super-networker), as well as being an inveterate 
gambler. Law, who possessed more than a tinge of narcissism, was also adept at the study of 
numbers. (Mackay 1852/1995, 1-38). Most importantly he had the ability to inspire trust in 
his investors to the extent that they failed to apply rational decision making or conduct due 
diligence. More recent examples of financial white-collar criminals such as and Ivar Kruger 
whose crimes were exposed after his suicide in 1932 (9); and the financier and insider trader 
Richard Whitney (10), described as Wall Street's 1930s version of Madoff, also exhibited 
these reference points of being able to exploit the resources that inhere in networks. 
 
Case Sources  
The article employs a qualitative approach (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Silverman, 2011), using 
the qualitative case method (Stake, 1995; and Yin, 2004, 2010 and 2011). Further, these 
illustrative cases were also selected following Chell’s recommendation, ‘…for analytical 
purposes to produce insight into the phenomena in question’ (2008, 2012). 
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Fraud is usually classified as a subdivision of criminology, termed white-collar crime or 
corporate crimes of the powerful (Newburn, 2007), and is also difficult to examine because of 
litigious and reporting constraints, as well as posing challenges associated with any criminal 
research area (Payne 2012: 4-19).  Given these constraints the Ponzi case was constructed 
using various academic and journalist sources, including his autobiography, ‘The Rise of Mr 
Ponzi’ (https://pnzi.com). This autobiography is an unreliable a narrative of events, 
nevertheless it gives an acute insight into Ponzi’s thoughts on how to construct and exploit 
social relationships. Narrative accounts of Ponzi’s criminal career were referenced (Zuckoff 
2005; Hurt 2009; Nars, 2009), as well as a number of papers that analyse Ponzi from a social 
network perspective (Baker and Faulkner 2004).  
 
The Madoff case study relied on a number of sources including descriptive accounts of the 
financial fraud (Arvedlund, 2009; Markopolos 2010; Lewis 2012; Henriques 2017). This 
developing literature stream, also includes a sub-genre written from a social network (Nash et 
al. 2013). In addition, archival sources were also referenced from the court records of Madoff 
v NY, to include victim impact statements, and the defendant’s Plea Allocution 
(www.justice.gov/.../united-states-v-bernard-l-madoff-and-related-cases). 
Carlo Ponzi: The Boston Swindler 
Ponzi arrived in America from Italy in 1903, later claiming in his autobiography that he had 
gambled away most of his inheritance on the voyage. He then proceeded to drift through a 
number of odd jobs including being a grocery clerk, road drummer (in modern parlance a 
sales rep), factory hand and dishwasher, before landing a position at the ‘Banco Zarossi’ in 
Montreal. Within a year the bank failed and Ponzi was convicted of forging bad cheques.  
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After serving 3 years in jail, he was subsequently convicted of smuggling aliens into the US 
for which he received a further 2 years in federal prison. On release, Ponzi after a number of 
colourful adventures (https://pnzi.com, chapter 52; Zuckoff 2006, 52-54), he became a clerk 
and stenographer for the J. R. Poole Company in Boston. This company focussed on foreign 
assets, and Ponzi was quickly promoted to a supervisory role at $50 per week. Dissatisfied 
with life as an employee he quit and set himself up as a commodities broker, narrowly 
escaping conviction for stealing cheese when hunger threatened (Zuckoff 2006, 86).  
 
It was at this low ebb in August 1919 that Ponzi set in motion his most famous con. (11) The 
scheme was to exploit an alleged anomaly in international postal law that according to Ponzi 
permitted a guaranteed profit. Ponzi’s scheme was to buy a type of foreign stamps named 
‘International Reply Coupons’, which could be purchased overseas for a penny or two and 
redeemed in the United States for six cents.  In theory, you could buy enough of the stamps to 
make huge profits: ‘to get rich quick’.  This was the basis for the fraud with Ponzi claiming 
his scheme meant that investors who bought into his fund would receive a 50% return on 
their money in 45 days; and a 100% return in 90 days.  Since banks at the time were paying 
five per cent interest annually, Ponzi's sales pitch aroused irrational enthusiasm, becoming an 
instant success with most investors piling in for the longer-term intent on higher returns, 
though Ponzi always stressed that they were entitled to withdraw money after 45 days. The 
scheme soon gained Ponzi a huge amount of cash and by the summer of 1920 deposits 
reached $250,000 a day.  Inevitably, this spectacular success aroused the interest of the local 
press, curious over whether this ‘wizard of finance’ could be legitimate.  Ponzi’s most 
perceptive critic was ‘The Boston Post’s’ legendary financial journalist, Clarence Walker 
Baron, who immediately saw through the financial fraud and mounted a successful campaign 
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to expose Ponzi, whose fall was as rapid as his rise. An insight into Ponzi’s view of the 
financial fraud can be observed when on handing himself in to police Ponzi was asked by 
reporters whether he wanted to make a statement.   ‘The public deserves it, don't you think?’ 
one reporter asked.    
‘The public deserves exactly what it gets,’ Ponzi said. ‘No more, no less.’  
Following a trial in 1920 Ponzi once again found himself behind bars, sentenced to 5 years in 
jail, with both his reputation and fortune in tatters. Ponzi was released in 1924 and launched 
another criminal scheme, focussed on land fraud in Jacksonville Florida, which led to further 
imprisonment and then deportation back to Italy. For the rest of his life he unsuccessfully 
pursued various frauds, including a flirtation with Italian fascism, and died unlamented in a 
charity ward of a Brazilian hospital in 1949. 
Bernie Madoff: The Crime of the Century 
‘He would never be the most charming person in the room. He would make you feel 
like you were the most charming person in the room. That was his gift’  
(https://www.npr.org/2011/04/26/135706926/examining-bernie-madoff-the-wizard-of-
lies).   
Zara Madoff ran a small brokerage firm that was investigated by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for failing to submit financial documents in 1963 (Nars 2009, 194). Her 
son Bernie followed in the family trade, founding BLMIS in 1960. Initially he concentrated 
on making markets for small parcels of bonds, however his ambition was to enter the more 
lucrative market of trading equities. At first BLMIS struggled to attract clients and Madoff 
focused his energy on exploiting familial and friendship and religious/ethnic ties as his: ‘… 
early financial clients were friends and relatives in the New York Jewish Community’ 
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(Arvedlund 2009, 25). Madoff was therefore following a typical start-up strategy of relying 
on social contacts to build commercially valuable networks (Davidsson and Honig 2002; 
Jenssen and Greve 2002). Madoff who was an expert at inspiring trust, charmed his way via 
family ties into the good auspices of retired attorneys, teachers and other professionals, to the 
extent that they started to invest with his supposedly ‘conservative’ and apparently reputable 
investment fund. Thus, Madoff used his social ties to develop crucial intangible assets 
(Cooke and Clifton 2002). 
His fortunes improved dramatically when Sol Alpern, a wealthy accountant, began spreading 
the word on Madoff’s uncanny ability to provide excellent returns. Alpern neglected 
however, to mention to his wealthy friends that his enthusiasm was related to having lent his 
son-in-law $50,000 to launch the broker-dealer business (Arvedlund 2009, 25-28).  
In the 1960s, Madoff concentrated on making markets for small parcels of bonds, expanding 
the firm so that he could eventually enter the more lucrative market of trading equities. His 
firm prospered and in the early 1970s he was credited with being one of the financial sector’s 
IT innovators, which aroused a hostile reception from the established brokers who hated 
computerization, and according to Madoff: ‘…even had congressional hearings against me’ 
(Gelles and Tait FT, 2011). Despite this opposition BLMIS continued to prosper and 
established itself as one of the largest independent trading operations in the securities 
industry, to the point that it had $300 million in assets in 2000 at the height of the Internet 
bubble and was ranked among the top trading and securities firms in the world.  
Driving this growth was Madoff assiduous cultivation of his reputation, both as an innovator 
and as ‘America’s Financial Guru’. Madoff possessed undoubted entrepreneurial flair and 
took the credit for the exploitation of computer technology to automate stock trading. It is 
also worth noting that the speed of technological change, which Madoff very much a 
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pioneered, posed challenges to the financial authorities, who found decentralized trading 
difficult to regulate (Arvedlund 2009, 40-44).  
In promoting technology trading Madoff also established himself as a vocal lobbyist for 
deregulation: he donated heavily to both the Democratic and Republican campaigns and sat 
on a number of committees advising on stock market restructuring, as well as acting as the 
chairman of NASDAQ. It is also significant that Madoff operated a hedge fund, and these 
funds were not required to register with the SEC until 2006, and hence were not subject to 
any regulatory scrutiny (Arvedlund 2009, 151). Madoff therefore exploited technology 
innovations, as well as regulatory lacunae to promote his firm and his criminal activity.   
Madoff claimed the fraud began in the 1990s, another view held by investigators was that the 
criminality started earlier in the 1980s, yet another and perhaps more plausible judgment is 
that BLMIS from its inception was a fraudulent organization (Nars 2009, 228-233). Madoff’s 
fraud which was only exposed by the liquidity squeeze, can be explained with reference to his 
reputation for returning investments promptly. Another reason was that he charged very low 
commissions, when the industry standard was for expensive financial fund fees. Madoff also 
distributed lavish fees and commissions to feeder funds, and further his generous donations to 
charities created reputational capital to the point that it was hard to consider that this noted 
philanthropist could be anything but legitimate 
Industry insiders had long puzzled over the success of Madoff and not everyone was shocked 
when the truth emerged that he had been running the biggest ‘Ponzi’ scheme in history. Harry 
Markopolos, a certified fraud examiner, was asked in 1999 by his employers, ‘Rampart 
Financial Management’ to reverse engineer Madoff’s strategy to find out how BLMIS was 
winning their potential client’s business. Markopolos claimed that: ‘When I saw the return 
stream, I knew it was a fraud in five minutes.’ He also claimed it took him only 20 minutes to 
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prove it was a fraud. (Arvedlund 2009, 90). Nevertheless, Madoff continued to prosper, 
despite Markopolos’ best efforts to stop him, including reporting his suspicions to the 
financial authorities (Ibid, 196-200).  
Madoff was convinced that he would be discovered on two occasions in 2003-4 and again in 
2006. The SEC however, failed to check the basics, such as investigating his account with 
Wall Street’s clearing Houses, and into dealing firms that were supposedly handling his 
trades. It is also notable that BLMIS was mistrusted by industry insiders. Goldman Sachs 
refused to put the fund on its approved list of intermediaries as Madoff’s strategies would 
have required massive trading in stock options and derivatives, and inexplicably none of their 
professionals had seen or heard of these trades: Credit Siuisse also recommended its clients to 
withdraw their Madoff investments as it could not fathom how BLMIS made its returns (Nars 
2009, 212). 
Evidence subsequent to the financial fraud’s collapse confirmed that Madoff had made few, if 
any stock or options trades for clients over the years. Instead his operation consisted of taking 
money in from new clients and paying it out to existing clients. Therefore, Madoff was 
running a giant pyramid scheme, which collapsed when depositors started withdrawing their 
money faster than deposits could cover. In the end the scheme caved in because large 
investors wanted to take their money out, not because they had lost faith in Madoff, but rather 
because they needed cash to cover other bad investments exposed in the financial downturn. 
Madoff always claimed that his firm was so successful due to an obscure ‘index option’, 
‘split-strike’ conversion strategy, an explanation that was also convincing enough to gull SEC 
investigators. Madoff further insisted that the split strike financial strategy was a proprietary 
secret and hence his investors had to sign confidentiality agreements. (12)  
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Social Capital: Redressing the Optimistic Bias 
Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam, are usually taken as the key founding 
scholars in social capital (Baron et al, 2000: 2-3; Field 2003: 13) and one of the few areas of 
accord between them was to interpret social capital as conferring advantages, thus it was 
taken to be an asset (Bourdieu 1985, 243; Coleman, 1990, 303; Putnam 2000, 319-325). This 
optimism remains evident in reviews of conceptual literature, (Lee, 2009; Portes and 
Vickstrom 2011), confirming Dasgupta’s observation that: ‘The recent literature on social 
capital has a warm glow about it’ (2005: 28).  
 
There is however, an emerging literature on the dark-side, or shadow aspects of social capital. 
Portes is arguably the leading scholar in this literature stream (1998, 2014; Portes and 
Lansdolt 1996; Portes and Vickstrom 2011), and he has summarised the negatives as 
fourfold: ‘…exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on 
individual freedoms and downward levelling of norms’ (1998: 15). Uzzi’s research into the 
negative effects of being over-embedded in the New York garment industry is analogous in 
emphasising the disadvantages of excessive network density (1996).  
 
The limited negative social capital literature has also coalesced into the deleterious effect of 
closed networks. Putnam, has cautioned about the negative effects of closure (2000, 350-
363), in his terminology of ‘bonding capital’, ‘…which bolsters are narrow selves’ (2000, 
23). The same phenomenon has been noted by Fukuyama (2001) and Dasgupta has reached 
the same conclusion on the dark-side of social capital, as he draws attention to network 
exclusivity, inequalities and exploitation (2005: 25-28). The negative effects arising from 
bonding social capital and its dense networks and closure mechanisms were recently 
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reviewed by Pillai et al, who identified ‘… the non-rational escalation of commitment’ 
(2017). 
There is also limited social capital literature in relation to corruption (Graeff  2007; Graeff 
and Sense 2013). These authors see social capital as a counter-weight to corruption, for 
instance contending that the ‘…augmentation of positive social capital could work as an 
effective counterforce to corruption’. In contrast, Uribe has argued that social capital 
networks provide fertile grounds for the development of trust that can expedite corruption 
(2013).  
 
Social Capital: Ontological Assumptions  
Social capital is more than the sum of its parts, and though it can be de-composed into its 
component dimensions for research purposes, nevertheless its essential qualities have to be 
considered in a synoptic or holistic purview. Thus: ‘Claiming that social capital can be 
studied as a dependent or independent variable ignores the possibility of complex causal 
mechanisms, which are not the exception but the rule’ (Adam and Roncevic 2003: 167). The 
extent social capital can be decomposed into sub-dimensions, while maintaining its integrity 
as a unifying concept has also been questioned by Maak (2007) and Anderson, et al (2007).  
Based on these observations this article conceptual understanding is that any sub-dimensions 
are complementary, inter-related and fluid (Jacobs 1961/1993, xvi-xvii; Liao and Welsch, 
2005, 347).   
 
It also follows from this holistic ontological understanding that any conceptual 
decomposition should be parsimonious in its number of sub-divisions. In conceptual literature 
the most prevalent approach to operationalizing social capital is to adapt Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal’s 3-dimensional decomposition (1998: 242-266). This article, however will modify 
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this model to exclude the ‘cognitive’ dimension, to be in keeping with the ontological 
understanding, as the limited decomposition of social capital into two sub-dimension 
facilitates the synoptic view of the concept. Further, Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s ‘cognitive’ 
dimension was specifically designed for their study into intellectual capital (1998, 244), and 
the data under this dimension could be captured under the relational dimension. Therefore, 
this research will limit its analysis to the following sub-dimensions: 
 
 Structural Dimension: ‘…refers to the overall pattern of connections between 
actors that is who you reach and how you reach them’ (1998: 244). 
 Relational dimension: ‘…describes the kind of personal relationships people have 
developed with each other through a history of interaction…It is through these on-
going personal relationships that people fulfil such social motives as sociability, 
approval and prestige’ (Ibid). 
 
Structural Dimension: Prior Start-Up Social and Family Networks 
In Hebrew Madoff could be described as a Shidduch, meaning a matchmaker; and in 
behavioural economics both Ponzi and Madoff could be termed as ‘connectors’ (Gladwell 
2001, 30-59). In network syntax, they cultivated ‘weak’ ties for ‘brokerage benefits’ and both 
intuitively grasped that: ‘People and groups who do well are somehow better connected’ 
(Burt 2005, 5).  
Ponzi and Madoff both relied on prior social and family connections at the start up stage of 
their frauds, which is an orthodox entrepreneurial approach to launching new ventures 
(Blundell and Smith 2001, 490).  For illustration, Ponzi registered his uncle J.S. Dondero as 
his partner for his ‘Securities Exchange Company’: Ponzi had considerable debts and the 
inclusion of his in uncle, who remained oblivious that he was a partner, added to the financial 
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creditability of his company (Zuckoff 2006, 118). Madoff also followed this pattern of 
exploiting familial and friendship ties (Arvedlund 2009, 25). Madoff first investors were 
lured into the fraud in social and non-commercial settings, for instance in the Catskills were 
New York Jews ‘vacationed’. In this relaxed social setting Madoff, who was an expert at 
inspiring trust, charmed his way via family ties. Madoff therefore acted in accordance with 
research that the extensive personal ties used by entrepreneurs often lead a blurring of 
business and social life, with mixed consequences (Jenssen and Greve 2002, 254-55).   
 
For the frauds both Ponzi and Madoff purposefully developed weak ties to serve as 
recruitment networks. Madoff was perceptive enough to realize that: ‘Who better to refer new 
clients than current satisfied clients’ (Arvelund 2009, 27). The fact that these agents usually 
took a fat commission was kept secret from the investors, and as they brought clients into 
Madoff’s fund, the agents also grew inordinately wealthy. For illustration of the recruitment 
network, Robert Jaffe, a noted philanthropist like Madoff, ‘worked’ the ‘Palm Beach Country 
Club’ to the extent that over 30% of its members eventually invested with Madoff. However, 
Jaffe failed to tell his ‘golf buddies’ about the commission he charged, or even the fact that 
they were investing their funds with Madoff. In return for this deception Jaffe became 
extremely wealthy, and the fraud continued apace. This deception also meant that a 
considerable number of investors in Madoff had no idea that they were connected to the fraud 
until they received news that the Ponzi scheme had collapsed and that they had lost their 
investments. The degree of criminal complicity of Madoff’s agents is open to question (some 
perhaps were innocents), though Madoff was in no doubt over their criminal culpability as he 
claimed that four of his earliest investors – Jeffry Picower, Stanley Chais, Norman Levy and 
Carl Shapiro – had helped recruit customers for his firm in the late 1980s, when Madoff was 
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having difficulty unwinding positions in the markets. ‘They were complicit, all of them. 
Which is why they being all settling’ (8th April, 2011, Financial Times). 
 
Ponzi’s fraud had also hit upon a similar feeder network strategy, and in theoretical terms 
Ponzi and Madoff were acting in line with literature emphasising the returns of weak ties 
(Granovetter 1973). This accords with Burt’s conclusion that: ‘Companies with a 
heterogeneous mix of alliance partners tended to enjoy faster revenue growth, and a dramatic 
advantage in obtaining patents’ (2005, 76).  The development of these weak tie recruiter 
networks also supports a process theoretical understanding that is self-generating, dynamic 
and subject to uncertain trajectories. As Burt’s research into financial employees illustrates: 
‘…social capital can be said to accrue to those bankers who already have it’ (Burt, 2006, 77). 
Ponzi and Madoff’s successful recruiter networks are therefore vivid illustrations of social 
capital’s weak tie theory in that they were extensive and self-generating and once established 
they developed in unpredictable trajectories. (Granovetter, 1973)   
 
As well as cultivating weak tie networks Ponzi and Madoff were astute enough to enhance 
their schemes by constructing closed networks, which is analogous to the criminology theory 
of exclusivity fraud. This dual approach to networks was not contradictory, and theoretical 
literature is clear in the respective benefits that accrue from different network tie strengths. 
For example, according to Burt: ‘Brokerage is about coordinating people between whom it 
would be valuable, but risky to trust. Closure is about making it safe to trust’ (Burt, 2005, 
97). Furthermore, according to Jenssen and Greve dense, an embedded network may provide 
better information and avoid information overload (2002, 263), an observation supported by 
Westerlund and Svahn (2007). Putnam has also noted the benefits of strong embedded ties: 
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‘The denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to 
cooperate for mutual benefit’ (1973, 173).  
 
In terms of closed networks both Ponzi and Madoff preyed on their own ethnic/cultural 
networks which both shared an unhappy history of being marginalised. Ponzi for example, 
considered that Italians and Jews were lumped together as ‘untouchables’ by the Bostonian 
financial establishment (Zuckoff, 2005, 173). He was also swift to defend the supposed 
targeting of the Italian community in an article in the Boston News Bureau by the esteemed 
financial journalist Clarence Brown, who levelled the charge that Ponzi was exploiting his 
own Italian immigrant community. Ponzi responded in a man-of- the-people-pose, filing a $5 
million lawsuit.  Ponzi also promised that if he won the suit that he would donate the $5 
million to charity (Zuckoff, 2005, 219-220).  
 
Coleman also observed that social capital is more likely to be created as an oppositional 
response (1990, 319), which is germane to this discussion as both the Italian and Jewish 
community’s in Ponzi and Madoff’s frauds regarded themselves as marginalised and 
discriminated against, in comparison to what they perceived as the WASP establishment. It 
followed that there was an oppositional response to perceived injustices to forge a strong 
sense of community with strong bonding social capital. (ibid, 20). However, the reverse side 
of this high trust context was that a skilful financial criminal could exploit this community 
resource, in part by emphasizing their shared cultural and ethnic ties. Ruth Madoff, for 
illustration co-authored, ‘The Great Chefs of America Cook Kosher’ (1996), and both 
swindlers donated ostentatiously to respectively Italian and Jewish charities. (13) 
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In addition to their ethnic networks, Ponzi and Madoff focused on cultivated close ties with 
key stakeholder groups. For obvious reason both cultivated networks comprising individuals 
from the regulatory, legal and police authorities, Madoff, a more astute swindler than Ponzi 
also fostered close ties with the financial regulators. For example, Madoff as well as serving 
as chairman of the NASDAQ, also acted as an advisor to the SEC on market structure and 
other issues. His influence over the SEC was such that Markopolos well-founded warnings 
were ignored: ‘...it seemed that Madoff had cast a shadow over the SEC’ (Arvedlund, 2009, 
196).  
 
In summary, the closed network literature emphasises that, ‘…not all connections connect us 
to resources that matter’ (Briggs, 2004, 152), and Ponzi and Madoff were calculating enough 
to target the most significant networks for facilitating their respective fraud. For example, 
Madoff developed close ties with the SEC by training their newly appointed lawyers in the 
hard to codify, context specific insider knowledge of Wall Street (Arvedlund, 2009, 195), 
resulting in closed tie relationships, which served to screen him from the concentrated gaze of 
investigators. Ponzi’s more fleeting swindle also prospered in part because knew the value of 
cultivating a closed network with the police and prominent journalists.  
Relational Dimension  
Ponzi and Madoff both purposefully targeted their own ethnic groups for the victims in their 
frauds (Perri and Brody, 2011, 34). Ethnicity is a concept defined with reference to language, 
religion, ancestry and location characteristics, and Ponzi and Madoff both surrounded 
themselves with members of their own Italian and Jewish communities. Thus, creating close 
proximity with those of a similar background who shared a sense of identification, which can 
be understood as ‘…the process whereby individuals see themselves as one with another 
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person or group of people’ (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998, 256). This is a typical response from 
ethnic minority entrepreneurs who will trade within a network based on common values and 
experiences relying on the trust of a shared social network (Portes and Sensenbaum, 1993). In 
social capital literature the same observation is made in Putnam’s bonding capital (2000, 362-
363); and in Lin’s conclusion there is a preference for homophilious interactions in networks 
(2001, 46-54). These observations are also detailed in, ‘Reference Groups as Perspectives’ 
(Shibutani, 1955) a concept that notes that economic activity is often based on shared socio-
cultural and religious values and characteristics. (14) 
Ponzi and Madoff understood the importance of being embedded in these ethnic 
communities: it wasn’t enough to be identified as either Italian or Jewish, they both realized 
they had to be known as leading and integral members of their respective communities. This 
is a socio-economic insight, embeddedness being first coined by Polanyi (1944/2001). 
For illustration Ponzi promoted himself as ‘a man of the people’ who told a rags-to-riches 
story of the Italian immigrant (like most of his investors) who had amassed a fortune in the 
teeth of opposition from the establishment. His popularity was such that crowds cheered him 
as the Boston financial establishment levelled accusations over his credibility. Expertly he 
promoted his popularity by asserting that the establishment wanted to keep the secrets of big 
profits from the masses, meaning Italian immigrants. He was hailed as a hero and walking 
between the Hanover Trust banks a quickly assembled crowd shouted: ‘Ponzi for mayor’ and 
‘Ponzi for governor’ (Zuckoff, 2006, 221). Ponzi adroitly maintained a high level of 
popularity in his own community, by posing as one of them with their best interests at heart. 
In sum, Ponzi’s seductive pitch was that he had found a way of providing financial 
opportunities for the masses, which previously had been the exclusive privilege of the 
established wealthy elite.  
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Madoff also acted in accordance with these insights, and for illustration donated heavily to 
ethnic (Jewish) charities, became a member of the Board of trustees for Yeshiva University 
and proclaimed his devotion to the Jewish religion and culture. Madoff was perceptive 
enough to recognize that charity, and more generally philanthropic activities in his own 
community were an excellent opportunity to develop feeder networks. This approach fitted in 
with Madoff’s preferred sales pitch of avoiding financial or ‘capital introduction’ parties, 
which would be full of financially savvy investors, who could ask many awkward questions. 
Instead, he preferred to target fellow philanthropists by word of mouth recommendations, and 
there was a concerted effort by Madoff and other members of his family to court the charity 
circuit, sitting on the boards of many charities and donating money to many others. This 
networking gave Madoff two opportunities. First, it allowed him access to high society that 
added lustre to his brand: it made him more respectable and consequently credible. Second, it 
allowed him to aggressively market his products to gullible charity commissioners and hence 
provided a lucrative source of investors. The success of the Madoff’s in convincing charities 
to invest an be gauged by the reforms being planned to charitable foundations altering their 
size and structure in order to decrease their reliance of ‘personal ties’ (Jagpal and Craig, 
2009).  
Ponzi and Madoff therefore grasped that their frauds depended on being accepted as 
upstanding members of their own communities, as their own communities provided the bulk 
of the investors. This perception accords with Fukuyama’s appreciation of culture in 
economic life which concludes: ‘As Adam Smith well understood, economic life is deeply 
embedded in social life, and it cannot be understood apart from customs, morals, and habits 
of the society in which it occurs. In short, it cannot be divorced from culture’ (Fukuyama, 
1996, 13). 
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Ponzi and Madoff also relied on maintaining a reputation above reproach as a key relational 
asset. For this analysis Burt’s two-level reputation generating hypotheses are most apt. The 
first ‘bandwidth hypothesis’ chimes with everyday assumptions in which the actor owns their 
reputation, in the sense that they define their behaviour, which in turn defines their 
reputation. Ponzi and Madoff were both high profile and seemingly success self-made men to 
promote their reputation via this obvious route, working assiduously to maintain a reputation 
for credibility. For instance, Madoff cultivated a brand identity that was conservative and 
reassuring: always immaculately presented, a committed family man and vigorous 
philanthropist who didn’t live an ostentatious lifestyle (Arvedlund 2009, 53). The Madoff’s 
were also noted for their conservative values, and paradoxically were associated with low risk 
financial strategies: Madoff to his cautious investors appeared anti-risk. Further his returns 
were good but remained within the realms of what a skilful and lucky trader could achieve in 
a good year 8-12% per annum-except Madoff uniquely achieved these returns every year. 
Ponzi also stressed his conservative social and political values (red-baiting) and emphasised 
his deeply rooted ‘American Standards’ and generosity by donating to deserving charities. He 
also presented himself as utterly committed to his wife Rose, and to garner mass support, as 
someone who was thinking about supporting a ‘wet’ candidate, opposed to Prohibition 
(Zuckoff 2006, 219-222). 
 
Ponzi and Madoff also exploited the processes described in Burt second ‘echo hypothesis’. In 
this hypothesis reputation is not owned by the individual, but rather is owned by: ‘…the 
people in whose conversations it is built, and the goal of those conversations is not accuracy 
so much as bonding between the speakers’ (2005, 196). In consequence: ‘Reputations do not 
emerge from good work directly so much as from colleagues’ stories about the work…the 
source of the reputation is stories third parties are telling one another’ (Ibid, 219-220). Ponzi 
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and Madoff both appeared to grasp that positive gossip was essential to maintaining their 
reputational assets, as from this perspective reputation is dependent on an individual’s 
freedom to make judgements: thus, reputation is transcendently motivated (Pastoria et al. 
2008, 335). For example, Ponzi was a hero to the poor Italian immigrants in Boston because 
he made sure they knew that he had made-good from a shared impoverished background 
(Zuckoff 2006, 221). It is striking even as Ponzi fraud unravelled his popularity on the streets 
remained undiminished: always with an entourage numbered in the hundreds he continued to 
be hailed as a hero by the assembled crowds, right until he confessed and admitted the fraud. 
Equally, Madoff was admired and much talked about as the former chairman of the Nasdaq 
stock market, a friend of regulators, and vice-chairman of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, his industry’s self-regulatory body. He was also a role model in that he 
lived a gilded but at the same time low-key life-style, flitting with his family between a 
penthouse in New York and holiday homes in Palm Beach and Long Island, travelling in 
private jets and on his yacht, called ‘Bull’.  Madoff also understood the value of acts of 
kindness for spreading positive word of mouth, and consequently constructed a caring 
persona (15). One reason Judge Chin cited for imposing such a long sentence was that he was 
deeply moved by the victim impact statements and letters including one from a widow that 
recounted how Madoff had visited shortly after her husband’s death. According to her letter, 
Madoff  had consoled her with a hug and with the reassuring words: ‘Don’t worry your 
money is safe with me’.  Later she deposited her pension fund with BLMIS and subsequently 
lost all of her investments with dire personal consequences (Lewis 2012, 26-31). 
 
Madoff and Ponzi further enhanced their reputations by cultivating highly respected network 
ties that could serve as a conduit to channel further victims into the fraud. In social capital 
literature Lin has noted that reputation is promoted by;’ …recruiting actors with a reputation 
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established elsewhere in society’ (1999, 154) and Ponzi and Madoff fully understood the 
value of these network ties for facilitating their fraud.  For example, Madoff developed a 
close commercial relationship with Michael Engler who ran a brokerage firm and enjoyed 
high status in his suburban community, based on his exemplary war record. Engler 
recommended many veterans to invest with Madoff, and these military ties also served to 
ensnare an extensive network of unsuspecting investors, who were in turn connected to these 
veterans. Ponzi also made great play of his bank directorship of the hitherto sober and 
respected Hanover Trust Company, to enhance his credibility and reputation. 
Ponzi and Madoff both targeted high trust religious/ethnic settings and social structures. For 
illustration, Madoff was skilled at targeting investors when they were at their most 
vulnerable, as noted by Judge Chin who admitted to being swayed in the severity of his 
sentence by a victim statement of a widow (Arvedlund, 275).  Madoff’s technique was to 
interact or approach investors in non-financial settings, thus to ingratiate himself in social and 
religious milieu’s as he knew that these environments fostered an ambience of trust in which 
investors would be more likely to see Madoff as ‘one of us’, and in consequence let their 
financial guard down. These trusting environments included country clubs in Palm Beach and 
the Hamptons and synagogues in Florida, New York, Minnesota and Los Angeles (Ibid, 26). 
Ponzi also detailed in his autobiography how he exploited the trust of a naïve priest 
(https://pnzi.com, chapter 7).  
Ponzi and Madoff were also expert at gaining trust without giving up a lot of information. 
This is significant as high levels of trust and a culture of shared values facilitate white-collar 
crime. Conversely, in low-trust cultures transactions are scrutinised in detail and economic 
actors are wary of being cheated. Therefore, though high trust culture can create economic 
advantages, for instance in terms of reduced transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1995), at the same 
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time high level of trust create opportunities for fraud.  Trust can be understood as a relational 
aspect of social capital that was essential to both criminals, as investors relied on this 
relational intangible instead of carrying out due diligence. In social capital literature, it has 
been contended that levels of trust are related to levels of social capital (Fukuyama 1995; 
Putnam 2000). Fukuyama has stressed the importance of trust and ‘ingrained ethical habit’ 
(1995) for ‘lubricating’ market-based transactions.  
Further, Madoff followed a typical fraud method, in claiming to have privileged ‘insider 
knowledge’ based on his special connections. Thus, it was taken that Madoff possessed 
exclusive bridging capital, or network brokerage opportunities that offered the privileged few 
access to highly lucrative financialopportunities. Furthermore, according to Cohen and 
Prusak trust is best thought of situational (2001, 179-180) and Madoff created the illusion of 
a very advantageous situation for his investors. High level of trust can be observed in the 
loyalty of Madoff’s investors, with widows recounting how their deceased husbands’ final 
words had been to implore them, ‘to never sell their Madoff holdings’ (Arvedlund, 2009, 50). 
Ponzi was also an excellent salesman who claimed that he was a ‘wizard of finance’, as well 
as being a self-proclaimed man of the people. Ponzi was trusted enough to attract investors, 
even though the precise nature of how his postal scheme returned any profits was never 
transparent.  It is also significant that Granovetter has noted from a social network 
perspective that victim/offender relationships in financial scams are based on a surprising 
level of intimacy (1992, 43-44). In Madoff’s case it has been claimed that this intimacy 
extended to a shared set of beliefs (Perri and Brody, 2011). 
Case Comparison 
There are striking similarities between Ponzi and Madoff in that they perpetuated schemes 
‘… of a size and scope that was unheard of at the time’ (Hurt 2009, 977). Consequently, 
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Ponzi was described in the Boston Post as the king of all the ‘get-rich-quick magnates’ 
(Zuckoff 2006, 285), and Madoff has been dubbed the ‘Criminal of the Century’ (Nars 2009, 
194). Further, whether by design or vicissitudes of fortune Ponzi and Madoff came to 
personify the dark-side or shadow aspect of their respective times; that is, they came to 
personifying different epochs of unethical financial hubris, as described by the anomie theory 
in criminology (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994/2013).  
The frauds also shared a number of operating characteristics, which have been discussed in 
detail under the social capital structural and relational dimension analysis. For example, both 
frauds started out as affinity frauds, with Ponzi targeting Boston’s Italian community and 
Madoff focus being on the Jewish community (Ventura and Daniel 2010; Perri and Brody 
2011).  Furthermore, both frauds played on the idea of championing excluded groups, 
confirming the view that social capital is readily created in opposition (see relational 
dimension). Ponzi stressed the outside nature of the Italian community against the 
establishment WASP bankers (see structural dimension), and Madoff played on the Jewish 
community being over-sensitive to accusations of avarice and hence reluctant to conduct 
diligence (Lewis 2012, 201-203). 
Both fraudster also understood the strategic importance of maintaining good relations with 
regulatory authorities, (Zuckoff, 2006, 119; Arvedlund 2009, 201). Madoff grip over the SEC 
was such that he would claim that every time a commission investigator came to his office 
they would ask for a job application (Lewis 2012, 73).  Another point of reference between 
the conmen was that they both faced formidable adversaries, who worked tirelessly to expose 
their frauds. Ponzi was brought down by Clarence Baron the esteemed editor who saw it as 
his duty to expose the fraud for the good of his readers (Zuckoff 2006, 219-220), while 
Madoff was pursued by the financial analyst Markopolis who worked tirelessly to expose the 
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criminality at BLMIS, as he later detailed in his book ‘No One would Listen: A True 
Financial Thriller’ (2010). One can speculate that these adversaries saw thorough the 
conmen’s artifice and recognised their true venal core, as described in neutralizing theory 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957). 
Conversely, it is worth noting that there are differences between the cases, which is consistent 
with the argument of this article as the contention is that financial frauds share essential 
reference points not that frauds will be identical. In these cases, one point to a number of 
differences. First, Ponzi’s scheme was short-lived and concentrated on Boston, in contrast 
Madoff’s fraud was long-term, and global in its corrosive reach. Ponzi’s financial fraud was 
also generated and perpetrated by its eponymous founder. The agents and hired staff Ponzi 
employed, were probably duped to the extent of the criminality (Zuckoff 2006, 232), and 
following Ponzi’s conviction there were never any demands for further prosecutions related 
to the fraud. It is indubitable though that Madoff had collaborators, a number of whom were 
pursued and convicted by the authorities (Lewis 2012, 56-57). The question remains 
unanswered as to the extent that Madoff was responsible for the totality of BLMIS criminal 
enterprise. Markopolis for one, is convinced that Madoff’s operation on the 17th floor of the 
Lipstick Building contained many collaborators beyond the immediate Madoff family. For 
example, Frank Di Pascali Madoff’s chief finance officer admitted his guilt as part of a plea 
bargain (Lewis 2012, 224), and it is also notable that two long-time Madoff investors, Carl 
Shapiro and Jeffrey Piccower received a much higher return than other investors (Arvelund 
2009, 235-241) It is under-discussed and telling that not all of Madoff’s investors lost money, 
as the majority took out more than they invested (Nars 2009, 220).  
Another significant difference is that in 1920 Ponzi was sentenced to a prison terms of 5 
years and released early in 1924, whereas Madoff was given the maximum tariff of a 
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symbolic 150 years (16). One explanation for the disparity in these prison terms is that since 
the Global Financial Crash (GFC) punishments for white-collar criminals have become more 
onerous, which it has been argued reflect the material values that dominate in contemporary 
society (Hurt 2009, 947-987).  
 
Conclusion: The Shadow Aspect of Social Capital  
The article has presented two cases of fraud to illustrate of how shadow social capital can be 
leveraged by sophisticated fraudsters to facilitate financial fraud. The cases demonstrate that 
there are shared essential points of reference or negative social capital characteristics between 
Ponzi and Madoff.  
 
The article has detailed that Ponzi and Madoff were masters at exploiting the dis-utilities of 
social capital and their fraud were predicated on sophisticated socio-economic insights into 
social interaction, as well as acute insights into behaviours and characteristics. The social 
capital analysis complements criminology literature by examining financial crime’s human 
factors and draws attention to the resources that inhered in the fraudsters social interactions 
and structures, in what remains the most heavily regulated industry in America. Further, the 
originality of this article has been to consider the recurring features of fraud from the shadow 
aspect of social, which expands criminology’s SNA approach of investigating the exploitative 
and deleterious effects of social networks, while also acknowledging the persistent social 
(capital) realities of social interaction in white-collar crime. Accordingly, the article has 
examined not just the pattern or structure of social relations, but also the more qualitative 
embedded, relational social realities that are built up over time, through reiterated interactions 
to create the social fabric of criminal network structures. From this point of view the article 
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has demonstrated that social capital analysis can move beyond its theoretical orthodoxy of 
being the ‘celebration…[of an] an unqualified public good’ (Portes and Levine 2014, 18407). 
 
 The implication of this article is that fraud will continue to be committed by white-collar 
criminals so long as they have the opportunity to exploit the resources that inhere in 
networks. Safeguards however, can be introduced to identify and prevent these criminal 
activities if the essential reference points are recognised and countered. For illustration, one 
consequence of Madoff’s fraud was a demand for more stringent regulations relating to the 
financial management of charities to ensure due diligence, to prevent trustee’s making 
decisions based on the ‘special trust’ favoured by financial criminals (Jagpal and Craig, 2009; 
Perri and Brody, 2011: 43-44). 
 
Notes  
1. St Peter’s Church in Westminster was sold to fund repairs at St Paul’s Cathedral in 
the City of London. Alternatively, the phrase may originate in paying for St Peter’s in 
Rome and St Paul’s in London during the Reformation.  
2. See Sunderland, who first used the term ‘White-Collar Crime’ in a 1939 article. Also 
see Smith et al, (2011, 7-10) for a discussion of the debate between criminologist who 
define their area very precisely, as opposed to those who understand it as a broad 
inter-disciplinary subject focused on criminal behaviour: this article will take the 
latter, broad definition. This broad definition is detailed by Payne, (2012, 435-462), 
who argues that theoretical explanations from criminology for white-collar crime 
include:  cultural theory; deterrence and rational choice theory, strain theory, learning 
theory; neutralizing and justifying white-collar crime; control theory; and self-control 
routing activities theory.  
3. Ponzi and Madoff’s frauds that have been termed bubble schemes, pyramid frauds, 
Ponzi frauds, affinity frauds, swindles, investment crime, and crimes of the financial 
system.  For this article ‘financial crime’ will be used as a catchall term to describe 
Ponzi and Madoff’s frauds. Financial crime has been defined by the ‘Financial 
Conduct Authority’ as ‘…any kind of criminal conduct relating to money or to 
financial services or markets’ 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/glossary/G416.html 
4. Coleman describes social capital as ‘…aspects of social structure that enhance        
opportunities of actors within that structure’ (1990, 302), while Putnam refers to 
generalized reciprocity quoting Tocqueville’s: ‘Self- interest rightly understood’ 
(2000, 135).  According to Lin social capital is: ‘social relations with expected returns 
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in the market-place’ (2001, 19), and Flap’s definition is, ‘…an entity consisting of all 
future benefits from connections with other persons’ (1988, 136). 
5. Putnam researched the causes and outcomes of different levels of civic 
engagement in Italian regions (1973), and his analysis was controversial 
(Manning, 2010). Bolin et al. (2002) have also argued in favour of citizenship 
having a generative role for social capital.  
6.  See, Lewis, (2012, 41-42) who, details cases exposed from 2008-2010 involving Tom 
Peters, Robert Allen Stanford and Scott Rothstein.  
7. Criminal networks have been analysed by Cressey, who created the influential ‘fraud 
triangle’ model and well as the orthodoxy that characterizes fraudsters as ‘trust 
violators’ (1979). 
8.  Affinity fraud refers to financial scams that prey upon members of an identifiable 
groups, such as racial, religious and ethnic communities, the elderly, professional 
groups, or other types of identifiable groups. The fraudsters who promote affinity 
scams frequently are –or pretend to be-members of the group’ (Perri and Brody, 2011, 
34).  
9.  ‘Fraud and Financial Innovation: The match King’, The Economist, December 
19th, 2007. ‘Introduction to Kreuger Genius And Swindler’ by Galbraith, available 
at: www.archive.org/.../kreugergeniusand006788mbp/kreugergeniusand006  
10. See, MacKay, 2013, who details that Whitney was declared bankrupt in 1938 and 
was found to be $6 million in debt. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five 
to ten years and served three years in Sing Sing and on his release found work as 
the manager of a dairy farm outside Boston. 
11. Zuckoff, states that it is highly likely that Ponzi fraud was inspired by an earlier 
swindler, 520% Miller: ‘Honest Bill’s’ promise on what investors would receive over 
one year.  
12. Avedon (2009, 279), notes that the investors: ‘…even honoured Madoff’s bizarre 
request: not to tell anyone he was managing their money.’  
13. Madoff targeted charities for his fraud, but he would never accept any 
investments from his favourite charity: ‘Lymphoma Research Foundation’. His 
son Andy suffered from lymphoma and the Madoff’ were generous donators, 
over $1 million in 2007. (Levenen 2008). “One Madoff charity goes Unscathed” 
Fortune, December 17th. Available at: ‘archive.fortune.com’.  
14. Shibutani (1955, 109) defines reference groups as a, ‘…a group which serves as 
the point of reference in making comparisons or contrasts, especially in forming 
judgments about one’s self’.  
15. Employees loved working for the Madoff's and most stayed with them till the bitter 
end.  See, Arvedlund for how ‘…Bernie garnered the loyalty- and cooperation-of 
those around him (2009, 180-181).’  
16. 150 years was the total maximum for the maximum for the 11 counts for which 
Madoff was convicted, and three times as long as recommended by the federal 
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